For me, one cause for optimism is reaction in the UK. This country never (consciously) takes a lead from America, we’re stubborn like that, but the umbilical cord from the UK was never cut. Energy in the right direction might seep in from there.
I don't mean to sound too defeatist here, but perhaps all prosperous societies inevitably devolve into bureaucratic stagnation. The institutional complexity that accumulates over time—regulatory capture, administrative bloat, entrenched interests—may represent an inescapable trajectory for mature economies.
The only sustainable escape mechanism involves finding new regions where economic dynamism can establish itself free from accumulated institutional constraints. This isn't a novel insight—we observe this pattern repeatedly throughout economic history.
America didn't escape this institutional trap through reform but through geographic mobility. Its centers of economic dynamism kept migrating over time as older regions calcified. Initially, the East Coast mercantile hubs drove growth, then Midwest industrial centers, followed by West Coast software innovation, and now Southwest green energy and shale gas development.
This geographic dynamism allowed America to continuously regenerate entrepreneurial energy by moving to regions with fewer regulatory constraints, lower costs, and more flexible institutions. Each new center could build modern infrastructure and governance structures rather than working within legacy systems.
Australia presents a more concerning picture. Melbourne and Sydney remain the dominant economic centers despite their increasing institutional sclerosis and cost burdens. Especially as mining became increasingly automated, these cities grew more economically important rather than declining in relative significance.
This geographic concentration may explain much of Australia's productivity stagnation. Unlike America, Australia lacks the internal geographic mobility that enables institutional renewal. Economic activity remains trapped in the most bureaucratically mature and expensive regions.
Perhaps the only path to escape this stagnation involves somehow enabling Queensland and Western Australia to become the next boom centers. These regions possess the geographic advantages—lower regulatory burden, cheaper land, proximity to natural resources—that could support renewed economic dynamism.
The question becomes whether Australia's institutional structure permits such geographic rebalancing, or whether the political and economic gravity of Melbourne and Sydney will continue concentrating activity in precisely the regions least capable of generating productivity growth.
This suggests that economic renewal may depend less on reforming existing institutions than on creating space for new ones to emerge in fresh geographic contexts.
94 seats in the House of Representatives is hardly a Bradbury moment.
I said it was a landslide…
Do you remember the Bradbury race?
Everyone else fell over.
The last federal election was competitive in several seats .
The Libs fell over buddy
The Nationals vote held up well and the Teals won around the same number of seats. The Libs fell over in the suburbs.But there were others skating.
For me, one cause for optimism is reaction in the UK. This country never (consciously) takes a lead from America, we’re stubborn like that, but the umbilical cord from the UK was never cut. Energy in the right direction might seep in from there.
On Economic Dynamism and Geographic Renewal
I don't mean to sound too defeatist here, but perhaps all prosperous societies inevitably devolve into bureaucratic stagnation. The institutional complexity that accumulates over time—regulatory capture, administrative bloat, entrenched interests—may represent an inescapable trajectory for mature economies.
The only sustainable escape mechanism involves finding new regions where economic dynamism can establish itself free from accumulated institutional constraints. This isn't a novel insight—we observe this pattern repeatedly throughout economic history.
America didn't escape this institutional trap through reform but through geographic mobility. Its centers of economic dynamism kept migrating over time as older regions calcified. Initially, the East Coast mercantile hubs drove growth, then Midwest industrial centers, followed by West Coast software innovation, and now Southwest green energy and shale gas development.
This geographic dynamism allowed America to continuously regenerate entrepreneurial energy by moving to regions with fewer regulatory constraints, lower costs, and more flexible institutions. Each new center could build modern infrastructure and governance structures rather than working within legacy systems.
Australia presents a more concerning picture. Melbourne and Sydney remain the dominant economic centers despite their increasing institutional sclerosis and cost burdens. Especially as mining became increasingly automated, these cities grew more economically important rather than declining in relative significance.
This geographic concentration may explain much of Australia's productivity stagnation. Unlike America, Australia lacks the internal geographic mobility that enables institutional renewal. Economic activity remains trapped in the most bureaucratically mature and expensive regions.
Perhaps the only path to escape this stagnation involves somehow enabling Queensland and Western Australia to become the next boom centers. These regions possess the geographic advantages—lower regulatory burden, cheaper land, proximity to natural resources—that could support renewed economic dynamism.
The question becomes whether Australia's institutional structure permits such geographic rebalancing, or whether the political and economic gravity of Melbourne and Sydney will continue concentrating activity in precisely the regions least capable of generating productivity growth.
This suggests that economic renewal may depend less on reforming existing institutions than on creating space for new ones to emerge in fresh geographic contexts.
The Liberal Party will survive - just - only so long as a competent right wing populist doesn’t appear. None visible so far
Has there ever been a competent right wing populist?
Politically competent (able to attract large portions of the vote) yes: Trump, Farage, Meloni, Weidel, Le Pen, Milei to name a few
I suppose Hitler would qualify under that definition.
Are you trying to provide more evidence for the study on how long it takes for Hitler to be raised in a social media exchange?
Are you trying to win today’s Richard Cranium Award?